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AGENCY, GENERAL AND SPECIAL*
By BASIL H. POLLITT**
III
SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE COURTS HAVE HELm GENBRAL AGENCY
TO EXIST
The idea of general agency usually connotes connection with-
some business,90 the idea of dealing with a class of persons, rela-
tively large in number, or the performance of a class of acts,97
the idea of continuity,98 of a relative degree of permanency,99
the idea of many contracts under one authorization.' 0 0
There were general agencies m the colony of Virgi °ia' 0 1 and
in the Plymouth Colony.1
0 2
Innumerable definitions of general agency could be given
but a few will suffice.'
03
*The first installment of this article Appeared in 17 Minn. L. Rev.
17 (1932). The final installment will appear in the November, 1933,
issue of the Kentucky Law Journal.
**A. B., LL. B., S. J. D., Professor of Law, New Jersey Law
School, 1926-32; Judah Philip Benjamin, Research Fellow, Harvard
Law School, 1931-32; author (with Gabriel Wortels) of "A Critical
Comment on the Privilege Against Self-Cramination," 18 Ky. L. Jour.
18. Compiler of casebooks on Agency and Real- Property designed for
use primarily in New Jersey Member New York, New Jersey bars.
Now engaged in Legal Research in Newark, N. J.
" Huffer v. First National Bank of Shelbyville, 242 Ill. App. 111
(1926).
"Butler v. Maples, 9 Wall. 766 (1869).
"Higgins v. Armstrong, 9 Colo. 38, 10 Pac. 232 (1885). Compare,
Southern Railway Company v. Grant, 136 Ga. 303, 71 S. E. 422 (1910),
Sieckmann v. Stanton, 251 Ill. App. 442 (1928).
"In re Senate Bill, 12 Colo. 188, 21 Pac. 48 (1888) (at 192 of 12
Colo.).
"'* Thi idea of continuity, etc., is no exclusive to general agency
as we have seen, supra, note 88.
21Perry v. The Executors of Randolph, 2 Va. Col. Dec. B. 7 (1682).
'*2Records of the Town of Plymouth (1667), p. 90.
"0The Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland Steam Navigation
Co. v. Dandridge, 8 G. and J. 248 at 318, 29 Am. Dec. 543 (1836). "In
the law of Principal and Agent, 259, it is stated that by a general
agent is understood not merely a person substituted for another for
transacting all manner of business, but a person whom a man puts
in his place, to transact all his business of a particular kind, as to
buy and sell certain kind of wares, to negotiate certain contracts, and
the like." Wilcox v. Routh, 17 Miss. 476, 481 (1848), MannIng v.
Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399 at 411 (1866), Schwartz v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 82 N. H. 177, 131 Atl. 352 (1925), Cooley v. Perrine, 41 N. J. L.
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For a number of years an erroneous idea, now fortunately
obsolete, was repeated by the text writers and some of the courts
to the effect that general agency was synomous with a universal
agency ' 0 4  This idea has now long been outgrown and has been
recognized by the courts as clearly erroneous.' 0 5
(a) A "Multitude of Instances" May Create a General
Agency.
"A multitude of instances", said Lord Ellenborough, in
"-Whitehead v Tuckett, 05 "constitute a general agency "
It seems clear that a general agency can never be inferred
from a special agency' 0 7 and reasonably clear that one special
agency cannot be inferred from another.'08
322, 32 Am. Rep. 210 (1879) (affirmed in 42 N. J. L. 623.). "A general
agent, Air. Russel, in his treatise on Factors and Brokers, p. 75, de-
fines to be either, first, a person who is appointed by the principal to
transact all his business of a particular kind; or, secondly, an agent
who is himself engaged in a particular trade or business, and who is
employed by his principal to do certain acts for him in the course of
that trade or business." Restatement, Section 13. "A general agent
is one authorized to represent his principal in the contractual negotia-
tions or bargainings of a particular business or employment, or in
those of a particular class or nature or in those at a particular place."
101 Birmingham Mineral R. R. Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron and 1.
1. Go., 127 Ala. 137, 28 So. 679 (1899). "A general agency implies
authority in the agent to act generally in all the business usually con-
ducted by the principal." The Home Lile Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 75 Ill. 426
at 435 (1874). "We understand a general agent to be one empowered
to transact all his principal's business," citing 1 Parsons on Contracts,
40. National, Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 Ill. 427 (1884),
Hooe and Harmson v. Oxley and Hancock, 1 Wash. 19, 1 Am. Dec. 425
(1791). "Agents may be clothed either with general or special
powers. 1st. A general agent may do everything which the principal
may. Powers of this sort are not usually granted, and none such ap-
pear in the present case."
1C ram v. The First National Bank of Jacksonville, 114 Ill. 516
(1885), La Point v. Scott, 36 Vt. 603 (1864). "If it be true, then that
a general agent can bind his principal to the same extent that the
principal can bind himself, this charge was correct. But a general
agent, is not a umversal agent, having the complete disposal of all
the rights and property of the principal. Such an agency completely
merges the legal existence of the principal in the agent, and such an
agency will never be inferred from general expressions and can only
be made out by the clearest proof of express authority." Aetna In-
demnity Co. v. Ladd, 135 Fed. 636 at 646 (1905) (C. C. A. Ore.).
21 15 East. 400 (1812). (See similar language in: Keith v. Hersch-
berg Optical Go., 48 Ark. 138 (1886)). See further, Belcher v. The Man-
chester Building and Loan Association, 74 N. J. L. 833, 67 Atl. 399
(1907).
I Stanley and Co. v. Sheffiel7d Land, Iron and Coal Co., 83 Ala. 260,
4 So. 34 (1887), Cheseboro v. Lockwood, 91 Atl. 188, 88 Conn. 219
(1914). Evidence was offered tending to show that the son of the
co-defendant had (1) filed tax lists for her, (2) made deposits in the
bank for her, (3) left her bank book to be balanced, and (4) occa-
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It is also the law that isolated, non-continuous, although
occasionally recurring, acts of special agency cannot amount to
a multitude of instances'0 9 and the same is true of a number of
repeated acts, each one under a separate specific authorization. 110
How many instances are there in a multitude then ? Are
two instances enough or are five needed 9 Or will only fifty or
more suffice I
The authorities do not agree on how many acts under one
authorization, occurring at relatively close intervals, will make
a multitude. It would hardly seem even arguable that two acts
would amount to a multitude,1" yet five acts under one author-
slonally drawn checks for her under a power of attorney. Held, that
these facts did not lead to the inference that he had authority to bind
her by a promise to pay for one-half the cost of a new line fence.
lppincot v. The East River Mill and Lumber Co., 79 Misc. 559, 141
N. Y. S. 220 (1913). "  a single act done under express author-
ity is insufficient to justify the inference that the assumed agent has
apparent authority to subject the alleged principal to liability upon
subsequent purchases made without actual authority."
"'3The Pennsylvania Co. v. The Franklin Fire Insurance Co. o
Philadelphia, 181 Pa. 40, 37 Atl. 191, 37 L. R. A. 780 (1897), Woolsey v.
Trimble, 18 F (2d) 908 (C. C. A. Ohio) (1927).
lw Jonesboro, L. C. and B. Ry. Co. v. McClelland, 104 Ark. 150, 148
S. W. 523 (1912), Goodrich v. Tracy, 43 Vt. 314, 5 Am. R. 281 (1871).
(In other words, the multitude must be at least fairly homogeneous.)
Huffer v. First National Bank of Shelbyville, 242 Ill. App. 111 (1926).
n* Collateral Loan Co. v. Bollinger, 195 Mass. 135, 80 N. E. 811
(1901). (1) A was in the retail clothing and jewelry business. He
employed B as a salesman to solicit orders. He gave B a grip con-
taining cheap jewelry, which he was authorized to sell to such persons
as he saw fit on the installment plan, B to collect the installments
(2) B was also to endeavor to sell more valuable articles than those
carried in the grip; he reported the names of these prospective cus-
tomers to A with what he knew about their financial standing, and, if
A was satisfied, he delivered the article desired to B, who delivered
It to the customer. (3) B pledged many articles of class 2 with pawn-
brokers, deceiving A, who, discovering the fraud, reclaimed the pledged
articles, hence this suit for an accounting and a lien ayainst A. Held,
(for A) that B had no general authority to sell or pawn the articles.
He was merely authorized to sell each of them to a particular person.
(Therefore he must have been a special agent.) Query- Is it fair to
third parties to let an agent be general one minute and special the
next, particularly where the two lines of employment are closely con-
nected? Fowler v. Cobb, 232 S. W 1084 (Mo.) (1921), Compare, Long-
worth v. Conwell, 2 Blackf. 459 (1831).
IuManhattan Life Ins. Co. v. First National Bank of Denver, 20
Colo. App. 529, 80 Pac. 467 (1905), McIntosh and Cathro v. Penney, 190
Ia. 194, 180 N. W. 177 (1920) (a single transaction in reality), Peters
v. Alter, 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 34 (1926). Compare Nester v. Craig, 69 Hun.
543, 23 N. Y. S. 948 (1893).
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ization may create a general agency,li 2 at least in the opimon of
some courts.
On the other hand, we have the radical views of Lord Cran-
worth and of the Irish courts. Lord Cranworth, dissenting m
Pole v Leask,1 13 argued that fifty separate authorizations did
not imply a fifty-first.
In Barrett v Irwne'A4 the Irish Court of Appeal held that
no multiplication of acts as a special agent can convert a special
into a general agent, following Foley v Carden'15
The only safe generalization to make is that nothing short
of a considerable multitude of instances will suffice to permit
general agency to be inferred from agencies that would other-
wise be special.116 What amounts to a multitude will have to
be more definitely determined by the gradual process of inclusion
and exclusion in the future.
The discussion immediately preceding brings up the interest-
ing question as to whether there is an intermediate, unknown,
undefined, class of agents. In other words, is there a twilight
zone of agency? It must be admitted that there is certainly a
great gap between "one" and "all" What sort of an agency
exists when we have an agent authorized to do more than one act,
but less than all the acts connected with a particular employ-
ment or belonging to a particular class, etc. I Should not
"'many" be substituted for "all" sn the definition of general
agency, or s it preferable to create an entirely new class oft
agents, which might be designated as the "middle" class of
2 The First National Bank of Conneautsvile, Pa. v. Robinson,
105 Ia. 463, 75 N. W 334 (1898). Compare Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y.
79 (1867) (three acts not enough). Also, compare, Jaris v. Pogue,
137 Ark. 475, 208 S. W 601 (1919). Query* What difference is there
between a carload of apples and a carload of horses? See Wiseman v.
Graham, supra, n. 20.
21 (House of Lords) 33 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 155 (1863).
1142 Ir. Rep. (K. B. D. 1907) 462 (1906).
"Is 4 New Ir. Jur. (N. S.) 195.
nOThe following cases are worthy of study in this connection:
Armour Fertilizer Works v. Maddox, 168 Ga. 429, 148 S. E. 152 (1929),
The Unon Stock Yard and Transit Co. v. Mallory, Son and Zimmerman
Co., 157 Ill. 554, 41 N. E. 888, 48 A. S. R. 341 (1895), Davis v. Talbot,
Receiver, 137 Ind. 235, 36 N. E. 1098 (1893), H. C. Angle und Co. v.
The Mississtppz and Missouri R. R. Co., 9 Ia. 487 (1859), Rankin v-
New England and Nevada Silver Mining Co., 4 Nev. 78 (1868), South-
western Surety Insurance Co. v. Marlow, 78 Okla. 313, 190 Pac. 672
(1920).
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agents? These queries are raised by reflection on a multitude of
instances.
Now and then the courts talk about an agent who is "more
than a special agent" -117 perhaps, in so doing, they are men-
tally grasping for this intangible, undefined twilight zone.
(b) General Agencies Have Been Held to Arise from the
Agent Himself Being in that Particular Line of Business.
A notion that formerly had much vogue in the law was that,
if a principal appointed a person as his agent, who was hnself
engaged on his own account in that particular line of business,
such as a broker or factor, such agent automatically became a
general agent, irrespective of the number of acts to be performed
by, or the scope of the powers entrusted to him. 1 8 This idea
appears to be prevalent in England at present,119 but has just
about died out in the United States.
120
The true rule would appear to be that such an intermingling
of the business of the principal and of the agent may result in
invoking an application of the law of "Undisclosed Principal"
l 0. C. C. and I. By. Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 348, 9 L. R. A. 754,
22 Am. St. Rep. 593, 26 N. E. 159 (1890).
us Bell v. Offut, 10 Bush. 632 (1874). "It is a rule that if one who is
himself engaged in a particular calling or business be employed to do
certain actN in that trade or business, he will be with respect to his
employment a general agent." (Syllabus.). Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Metc.
193, 35 Am. Dec. 358 (1840), Blair v. Shersdan, 86 Va. 527, 10 S. E.
414 (1889). "There can be no doubt that, as a general rule, if a man
expressly empower another as his auctioneer, broker, or factor, or
other professional agent, and privately restrict his powers, that a
presumption of an authority to deal with the goods according to the
agent's usual course of business will arise," (thus attaching a legal
consequence that results only from general agency).
1119  Halsbury's Laws of England, p. 152. "A general agent is one
who has authority, arising out of and in the ordinary course of his
business or profession, to do some act, or acts on behalf of his prin-
cipal in relation thereto "
12Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peoples, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 142 (1904).
"We cannot assent to the proposition that if one transmit an order to
a broker in stock or produce or insurance or any other subject of com-
merce with a limitation as to price or amount or time, the broker may
enter into a contract in violation of his instructions which will bind
his principal in the absence -of conduct on the part of the latter from
which a general authority might be inferred. Special orders involving
large sums are daily given, and, if it be claimed that brokers so re-
ceiving them may disregard their instructions and make different
contracts for their principals, clear authority should be shown for such
a rule of .law."
K. L.--4
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or even in creating an apparent authority,1 2 1 but will not neces-
sarily make an agency general that would otherwise be special.
(e) The Fact that an Agent Handles All the Business of
His Principal in a Certain Area May Make His Agency General.
A very large number of general agencies may be grouped
together under this heading. An agent who represents his prin-
cipal with respect to all his business at a given place or in a
certain territory, is almost invariably designated by the court
as a general one.122 The rule operates equally whether the
agent be a representative of his principal only at a certain
place' 23 or is in charge of a certain area 24 or even-has a whole
state as his territory 125
Closely connected with the idea of an agent in a certain area
2''Compare, Pickering v. Bush, 15 East 38 (1812).
- C. C. C. and St., L. Ry. Co. v, Moore, 170 Ind. 328, 82 N. E. 52,
84 N. E. 40 (1907). "Shaw was a general agent
since he was authorized to transact all of its business at the
particular place, " Plummer v. Inight, 156 Mo. App. 321, 137
S. W 1019 (1911). Compare, C. 0. C. and. St. L. Ry. Co. v. The Moline
Plow Co., 13 Ind. App. 225, 41 N. E. 480 (1895). Here A was the agent
of the Plow Co. to distribute (i. e., store, transfer and ship) its
products throughout the state of Indiana. A must have been, there-
fore, a general agent. But held, that A had no authority to sell the
goods without the special permission of the Plow Co. "An agent for
one purpose only, cannot lawfully do another act and bind his prin-
cipal."
123St. Louts Southwestern Ry. Co. v. The Elgin Condensed Milk Co.,
74 Ill. App. 619 (1898) (Aff'd 175 Ill. 557, 51 N. E. 911, 67 Am. St. Rep.
238). (Agent in charge of Chicago office of a railroad). Fatman v. Leet,
41 Ind. 133 (1872), English v. Ayer, 79 Mich. 516, 44 N. W 942 (1890),
Lowenstein v. Lombard, Ayres and Co., 164 N. Y. 324, 58 N. E. 44
(1900), Johnson v. Jones, 4 Barb. 369 (1848). Compare, Mussey v.
Beecher, 3 Cushing 511 (1849), wherein the place rule yielded to other
considerations, namely to a numerical limitation.
11Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Ladd, 135 Fed. 636 (1905) (C. C. A.
Ore.), Singer Mfg. Co. v. McLean, 105 Ala. 316, 16 So. 912 (1894)
Columbus Show Case Co. v. Bmnson, 128 Ga. 487, 57 S. E. 871 (1907),
Potter v. Springfield Milling Co., 75 Miss. 532, 23 So. 259 (1897).
L_ Wood v. McCain, 7 Ala. 800, 42 Am. Dec. 612 (1845) (State of
Alabama), Oil City Iron Works v. Bradley, 171 Ark. 45, 283 S. W. 362
(1926) (State or Arkansas), Federal Surety Co. v. White, 88 Colo. 238,
295 Pac. 281 (1930) (State of Colorado), The Home Life Ins. Co. v.
Pierce, 75 Ill. 426 (1874) ("the northwest"), U. S. Life Ins. Co. v. Ad-
vance Co., 80 Ill. 549 (1875), (State of Illinois), B. T. Kenney Co. v.
Anderson, 26 Ky L. R. 367, 81 S. IV 663 (1904) (Kentucky and other
states), Belcher v. The Manchester Building and Loan Association,
74 N. J. L. 833, 67 Atl. 399 (1907) (State of New Jersey, perhaps),
Jacoby and Co. (Ltd.) v.. Payson, 85 Hun. 367, 32 N. Y. S. 1032 (1895)
(U. S. and Canada), Interstate Savings and Trust Co. v. Hornsby, 146
S. W 960 (1912) (State of Texas-not reported elsewhere)., Smith v.
Droubay, 20 Utah 443, 58 Pac. 1112 (1899) (State of Utah).
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or at a designated place is the problem of territoral restric-
tions. Suppose A, my agent, has been given X territory to work
in. If A now transacts business professedly on my behalf in
area Y, am I bound or may I successfully -disavow the act of A,
on the ground that his general agency existed only in X I
Nearly all the cases involving a territorial restriction upon
the authority of a general agent involve insurance agents. It
has been thought that such a restriction was not binding on a
general agent.126 There is, however, practically equal authority,
both numerically and qualitatively, to the contrary 127
The case of the railroad station agent stands on a somewhat
different footing. There has to be one station agent in every
town through which the railroad passes. His authority, there-
fore, is purely local and he is invariably bound by geographical
limitations on his authority 128
L"St. Louts and Memphzi Packet Co. v. Parker, 59 Ill. 23 (1871).
Action against a common carrier for goods delivered to its agent at
Cairo and "swept away by the rising flood of the Mississippi." D
contended that the agent's authority was limited to the city of Cairo.
Held, that if defendant employed Captain H as agent at Cairo and
permitted him to advertise his name as agent without noting the above
limitation, plaintiff would not be bound by it without actual knowledge
thereof. Inghtbody v. The North American Insurance Co., 23 Wend.
18 (1840). A geographical limitation on the authority of a general
agent for an insurance company is not binding on third parties ignor-
ant of the limitation. Here B was a general agent of the insurance
-company for Troy and vicinity. Held, that insurance issued by him at
Utica, 100 miles away, bound the company. Atlas Assurance Co., Ltd.
of London, England v. The Hub, Inc., 109 Okla. 101, 235 Pac. 172 (1925).
The A Insurance Co., a foreign, corporation, had B as its agent at X
and vicinity, E as its agent at Y. B solocited and issued a policy at Y
to C, B being a general agent. Held, that C was able to recover from
A on the policy.
S1 pringfield Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Ferrell, 141 Ala.
App..527, 71 So. 615 (1916), Parks v. The President and Managers of
the S. and L. Turnpike Road Co., 4 J. J. Marsh. 456 (1830). See
Problem Case No. 17. Baldwin v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 182 Mass. 389, 65 N. E. 837 (1903). Here one Cooper was the
general agent of the insurance company in western New York and a
soliciting agent in Massachusetts. Held, that Cooper could exercise no
authority as a general agent in Massachusetts and certainly a mere
soliciting (i. e., special) agent could not make the unusual oral con-
tract made here, to-wit, that the life insurance should take effect im-
mediately, before a medical examination and before payment of the
premium except by way of a promissory note.
Compare, Flint v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 73 N. H. 141, 59
Atl. 938 (1905). See Burgher v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 105 Ia. 335, 75
N. W 192 (1898), Hunter v. St. Louts, etc., Ry. Co., 167 Mo. App. 624,
150 S. W 7.33 (1912), Gathright Y. Pacfic Express Co., 105 Ter. 157,
145 S. W. 1185 (1912)1.
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(d) Authority to Handle All Negotiations of a Particular
Class or to Make Many Contracts Under One Authorization May
Make an Agency General.
A large group of cases which illustrate the meaning of gen-
eral agency consist of decisions in which the representative of
the principal handles all the negotiations of a particular class.
Under this state of facts the inference and holding of general
agency nearly always follows.
129
We have seen that a special agent may have authority to
make a number of contracts under one authorization, neverthe-
less, this factor is much more characteristic of a general
agency,130 and is often the decisive element in the case.
(e) Known Agents are Presumed to be General.
Every known agent may be presumed to be a general one by
the third party negotiating with him.13 ' This rule has many
2 Edwards v. The Home Insurance Co., 100 Mo. App. 695, 73 S. W
881 (1902) (baseball club employs firm of insurance brokers to take
entire charge of the insurance affairs of the club), Hall v. Hopper,
64 Neb. 633, 90 N. W 549 (1902) (agent to buy grain), Magnus v.
Platt, 62 Misc. 499, 115 N. Y. S. 824 (1909) (driver for an express
company), Ruffin v. Mebane, 41 N. 0. (6 Iredell Equity) 507 (1850)
(buying and selling negroes), Land v. Reese, 136 S. C. 267, 134 S. E.
253 (1926) (agency to make investments of money), discussed by
Mechem in 21 Il1. L. R. 722. Analogously, Arkadelphia Milling Co. v.
Green, 142 Ark. 565, 219 S. W 319 (1920).
,:°Jeffrey v. Bigelow and Tracy, 13 Wend. 518, 28 Am. Dec. 476
(1835). An agent to sell all or any part of a flock of sheep, in such
numbers, to such persons and for such prices as in his discretion he
thought proper, is a general agent.
I Oak Leaf Mill Co. v. Cooper, 103 Ark. 79, 146 S. W 130, (1912).
(The burden is on the principal to show notice to, or knowledge by,
the third party of a limitation on the authority of a: general agent.)
Three States Lumber,Co. v. Moore, 132 Ark. 371, 201 S. W 503 (191S),
Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. Green, 142 Ark. 565, 219 S. W 319 (1920),
Watertown S. E. Co. v. Davis, 10 Del. (5 Houston) 192 (1877).
"Wherever an agency exists, it is presumed to be general, or general
about the business with which it is concerned, and the public is
authorized so to regard it." But compare, Maher v. Moore, 42 Atl. 721
(1898) placing a rational limit on the rule in Delaware. Gaar, Scott
and Co. v. Rose, 3 Ind. App. 269, 29 N. E. 616 (1891) (one ddes not
deal with a general agent at his peril and there is no duty to ascer-
tain the extent of his powers. To support the verdict in the court
below the agency may be presumed to have been a general one). Com-
pare, Jasper County Farms Co. v. Holden, 79 Ind. App. 214, 137 N. E.
618 (1923) apparently contra. Austrian and Co. v. Springer, 94 Mich.
343, 54 N. W 50, 34 Am. St. Rep. 350 (1892), Mitchell v. Canadian
Realty Company, 121 Me. 512, 118 Atl. 373 (1922), Sharp v. Knox, 48
Mo. App. 169 (1891), Midland Savings and Loan Co. v. Sutton, 30 Okla.
448, 120 Pac. 1007 (1911), Daniel v. Pappas, 93 Okla. 165, 220 Pac. 355
(1923), Rae v. Heilig Theatre Co., 94 Ore. 408, 185 Pac. 909 (1919),
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important consequences. Followed to its logical conclusion, no
agent as to such third party would be a special agent unless the
principal brings home to him notice of such fact or the circum-
stances of the case put him on inquiry At the trial the third
party makes a prima facie case by proving an agency relation-
ship and raising an inference that the act done was within the
general line of the principal's business. The burden of going
forward with evidence to overcome the presumption of a general
agency then rests on the principal.
132
An analogous rule with which it is somewhat more difficult
to agree is the one announced in a few decisions1 33 that an agent
is presumed to be acting within the scope of is authority This
rule seems to go too far to meet the approval of the orthodox,
conservative, legal iund. If this rule be correct, then every
third party should rely on the presumption in question and have
a right abstain carefully from any inquiry whatsoever, irrespec-
tive of whether the agency be general or special. The statement
would appear to be as fallacious as the one that everybody is
presumed to have a good character.
13 4
Care must be exercised by the courts not to apply the rule
of a presumption of general agency in cases where the fact of
special agency is clear and the third party should be charged
-with notice of such fact. The harmful results of such lack of
care are shown by the erroneous result reached in Smith v Drou-
bay.13
5
(f) Service of Process.
Statutes frequently provide that process may be served on
C. B. Parks Grain Co. v. Townsend, 267 S. W 1011 (Tex. Civ. App.)
(1924), Smith v. Droubay, 20' Utah 443, 58 Pac. 1112 (1899), Contra,
Interstate Securities Co. v. Third National Bank, 231 Pa. 422, 80 Atl.
888 (1911), also contra, Dickinson County v. The Mississippz Valley
Insurance Co., 41 Ia. 286 (1875).
=The presumption is, of course, merely a prima facie one, and
not conclusive. Pullman Palace Car Company v. Nelson, 22 Tex. Civ.
App. 223, 54 S. W. 624 (1899). The fact of agency must of course be
proved before the presumption can be invoked. Arthur Jordan Piano
Co. v. Lewis, - Del. -, 154 Atl. 467 (1931), McDonald Admr v.
Strawn, 78 Okla. 271 (1920), Shuler v. Viger, 123 Okla. 110, 252 Pac.
18 (1926).
"'Kiborn v. Prudential Insurance Co., 99 Minn. 176, 108 N. W
861 (1906), Midland gavings and Loan Co. v. Sutton, 30 Okla. 448,
120 Pac. 1007 (1911).
" Greer v. United States, 245 U. S. 559, 38 Sup. Ct. 209, 62 L. Ed.
469 (1918).
-=Stated supra, note 31.
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the general agent of a foreign or domestic corporation. To
determine the validity of service of the process in question, and
thereby to decide whether the court has acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, it is necessary for the court to
nquire as to whether the individual served was, or was not a
general agent. This inquiry proceeds along the normal lines of
the groups into which general agency falls, the test being,
whether the person served would be a general agent in other
respects. 136
IV
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FLown G FROm GF TERAL AGENCY
(a) Third Partses are not Bound by Unknown Imitations
Placed upon the General Agent by His Principal.
We have seen that special agents must strictly pursue their
authority and that third parties deal with them at their peril.
The inquiry now arises as to what extent these rules, which are
so characteristic of special agency, apply to general agency
The answer is clear-they do not apply at all. Instead of third
parties dealing at their peril with a general agent, the situation
is just reversed, and the peril is normally on the princtpal, who
has sent his general agent out into the world clothed with the
insigma of authority
Life is too brief and fleeting, the affairs of the modern busi-
ness world too intricate and complex, the presumption of ordi-
nary honesty too great for men of affairs to pause in their deal-
ings and inquire as to the extent of a general agent s author-
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ISO Great West Min. Co. v. Woodmas of Alston Min. Co., et al., 12
Colo. 46, 20 Pac. 771, 13 A. S. R. 204 (1888), Toledo, Wabash and
Western By. Co. v. Owen, 43 Ind. 405, 408, 409 (1873)) (a case that
seems to run counter to the legislative intent). Little v. Minneapolis
Threshing Machine Co., 166 Ia. 651, 147 N. W 872 (1914) (a great
deal of the evidence bearing on the point appears to be nothing more
than conclusions of law).
"' Smith v. McGuzre, 3 H. and N. 554 (1858). "If a person professes
to convey an estate as trustee, the party taking the conveyance from
him is bound to ascertain that he had authority, as trustee, to convey
it; but the same principal does not apply to commercial dealings. It
would be most inconvenient if a person could not go into a shop and
purchase an article without first asking the shopman whether he has
authority'to sell it. It may be that he was merely employed to sweep
the shop; but it would be absurd to apply to the general business of
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A third party, then, dealing with the general agent of a
principal is not bound by undisclosed or unknown limitations
placed on the authority of the agent by the principal. As to
such third party, the agent need not strictly pursue his author-
ity, so long as he keeps within the usual line of is employer's
business and does not abnormally deviate therefrom, nor -does
the third party act at his peril m dealing with the agent, and
this is true although he has made no inquiry of the principal.
One of the earliest modern cases in which the rule was
life the doctrine as to the necessity of ascertaining whether an agent
is acting within the scope of his authority-indeed the business of
London could not go on." Southern Pacific Co. v. Duncan, 16 Ky. L. R.
119 (1894). "A person dealing with the freight agent of a railroad
company has the right to suppose that he has all the powers ordinarily
incident to his business, unless he has knowledge to the contrary.
Prudent men are accustomed to rely on the acts and statements of
such agents in reference to the business with which they are connected.
Men have not time to stop and inquire of- the heads of the depart-
ments as to the powers of those whom they have placed in positions
for the purpose of dealing with the public. It is only when the custom
of limiting the authority of the agent has become so general that it
is a part of the ordinary business knowledge of the world that third
parties should be affected by it." The Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld, 12
Clarke and F 248, at 285 (1844) (House of Lords). "Now there can be
no doubt that Francis Wedge was his agent for the inclosure and for
the exchange. He was his general agent for these purposes. The secret
limitation imposed by him on the authority of his agent, uncommuni-
cated to the other side, goes for nothing. I have no doubt in the world
that the Duke did impose that limitation on Mr. Wedge's authority.
That is a matter between Mr. Wedge and him, and it is wholly im-
material to Mr. Neeld." I_:ndroth v. Litchfield, 27 Fed. 894 (C. C. In.)
(1886). "If a merchant, at a distance, should establish a house for
the sale of merchandise, and put it in charge of an agent, would not
that agent have full power to make all sales within the ordinary scope
of that business, and according to its usages? In such case, would
any instructions to the agent, not notified to third persons, restrain-
ing his authority .to sell, or directing his manner of making sales,
contrary to the usages of the trade, be of the least avail in respect
of the validity of sales made by the agent to third persons? None
whatever." It must be frankly admitted that another explanation is
frequently, perhaps nearly always, possible for the cases cited in sup-
port of this proposition, viz.. that of apparent authority. In actual
authority the manifestation by the principal to the third party coin-
cides with the representation to the agent. In apparent authority' the
two manifestations are bound to be different. See Restatement, Section
10; Columbia Mill Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 52 Minn. 224
(1893). From this it follows that if A, appoints B his general agent,
but places a limitation on his authority Unknown to C, the third
party, C may hold A (1) because of a legal consequence flowing from
general agency, or (2) because of an apparent authority. It is sub-
mitted that the explanaiton of general agency is in accord with What
the courts say a large part of the time and is more likely to lead to
clear, precise, close-cut legal thinking than the explanation of apparent
authority.
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applied is Nickson v Brohan,138 holding that if a master send a
clerk who has the general management of his cash concerns with
a note to a banker to receive the money, and the servant, instead
of so doing, gets another person to give him a draft upon the
banker for it, and the banker fails before the draft is presented,
the master is liable for the loss. The court said at page 110
"But the court were all of opinion, that the verdict was well given,
and that the master was chargeable, and he only; for a servant, by
transacting affairs for his master, does thereby derive a general
authority and credit from him, and if this general authority should
be liable to be determined for a time, by any particular instructions
or orders, to which none but the master and servant are privy, there
would be an end of all dealing but with the master."
A hundred years later in Whitehead v Tuckett,139 Lord
Ellenborough held.
"If these expressions are to be construed into so many restrictions
of the power of the brokers, it will follow that they were not only
limited as to price, but also as to the terms of sale, which according to
the latter were to be the best, and as to the purchasers who were to
be safe men; and if in either of these respects the contract made by
them should fail, their principal would have a right to reject it. But
if this could be done, in what a perilous predicament would the world
stand in respect of their dealings with persons whQ may have secret
communications with their principal. Such communications therefore
must not be taken as limitations of their power, however wise they
may be as suggestions on the part of the principal."
The rule applies to all sorts of circumstances and conditions,
thus, it will override a numerical limitation.
140
Where the rule applies, a requirement by the principal that
all contracts and agreements made by the agent shall be ineffec-
tive until approved by him, the principal, is of no force, and
does not bind the third party unaware thereof.
141
'10 Modern 109 (1713).
" 15 East. 400 (1812). Walker v. Skzpwith, Meigs 502, 33 Am. Dec.
16 (1838). "If such instructions, in such a case as this, would excuse
the principal from liability, innocent persons dealing with an un-
faithful agent would be constantly liable to loss; while his prificipal,
by employing, and giving him credit with the public, would be liable
to no responsibility for his frauds, provided he had given him private
instructions. This would be reversing the rule of law upon this Idub-
3ect. The rule is, that where one of two innocent persons must suffer
by the fraud of q third, he who enabled that person, by giving him
credit to commit the fraud, ought to be the sufferer."
1 0Palmer and Sons v. Cheney, 35 Ia. 281 (1872), Shaw v. Indio
Cattle Co., 40 F (2d) 835 (C. 0. A. Texas) (1930).
", "Montgomery Furniture Co. v. Hardaway, 104 Ala. 100, 16 So. 29
(1893). (One B was the manager of a furniture store' in Montgomery,
the owners of which resided in Baltimore. B was employed under a
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Under tins rule, a general agent may make valid oral con-
tracts with a third party, although limited by- his principal to
contracts M writing,14 2 and the converse of this proposition is
also perhaps true, that is, he may make written contracts that
brad his principal although restricted to oral ones. A special
agent probably has no such authority 143
A general agent may buy on credit and thereby render his
principal liable, although limited to purchases for cash.1'4  On
written contract setting out his powers, etc., forbidding him to rent
a store, buy anything, or contract a debt in the name of the defend-
ants without their approval. It appears from the evidence of the
plaintiff that B bought two horses on. credit, one of which died after
the date set for passing of title. Held (for plaintiff, affirmed), that B
was a general agent. A general agent may exceed his express authority
and yet his principal be bound,, for the scope .and character of his
business is the measure of his authority.) Portland Motor Sales Co.,
Inc. v. Millett, 124 Me. 329, 128 Atl. 694 (1925), Potter v. Springfield
Milling Co., 75 Miss. 532, 23 So. 259 (1897). Compare, Philip Crumer
Lumber Co. v. Algonquin Lumber Co., 123 Miss. 157, 85 So. 191 (1920),
apparently contra. Benesch v. The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 16 Daly 394, 11 N. Y. S. 714 (1890).
"-Bennett v. S. Blumenthal and Co., Inc., 113 Conn. 223, 155 Atl.
68 (1931), Armour and Co. v. Ross and Barfield, 110 Ga. 403, 35 S. E.
787 (1900), Van Santvoord v. Smith, 79 Minn. 316, 82 N. W 642 (1900),
Gooding v. Moore, 150 N. C. 195, 63 S. E. 895 (1909), Portland Motor
Sales Co., Inc. v. Millett, 124 Me. 329, 128 A. 694 (1925).
"'Baring v. Peirce, 5 Watts & S. 548, 40 Am. Dec. 534 (1843).
"Liddell v. Schline, 55 Ark. 627, 17 S. W 705 (1891). A manager
of a cooperative association with power to conduct a general mer-
cantile business for it, to buy and sell, etc., binds the association by a
purchase on credit, even though he is directed to buy only for cash.
Compare, Thomas v. Fursman, 39 Calif. App. 278, 178 Pac. 870 (1919),
Bacon v. Dannenberg Co., 24 Ga. App. 540, 101 S. E. 699 (1919), Contra,
Americus Oil Co. v. Gurr, 114 Ga. 624, 40 S. E. 780 (1902). But here
the agency was a special one. Fatman v. Leet, 41 Ind. 133 (1872)
(fact of settlement by principal with the agent is immaterial), Cruzan
v. Smith, 41 Ind. 288 (1872), Rich v. Johnson, 61 Ind. 246 (1878) (the
rule is contra in the case of special agency). Compare, Inglish v.
Ayer, 79, Mich. 516, 44 N. W 942 (1890). Here one B was the agent
of A at Alpena, with authority to buy ties, etc., in that vicinity, make
contracts for that purpose, and advance money on them. A claimed,
when sued on a contract made by B, that B had no authority "to ad-
vance supplies and money for ties beyond what was received by him."
But held (for the third party), that B was a general agent and the
usual rule applied. Analogously, Furnas, Irish and Co. v. Prankman, 6
Neb. 429 (1877). Here A employed B as a general agent in the sale
of nursery stock, with full authority to employ subordinates in the
name of the firm. A and B had an agreement that B's sub-agents should
look to him solely for compensation. B employed C, who was ignorant
of the aforesaid agreement. Held (for C against A) that C was not
bound by the unknown limitation on the authority of B. Analogously,
Johnson v. Jones, 4 Barb. 369 (1848). A employed B to manage his
grocery store at Syracuse. Held, that B was a general agent. A told
B not to sign any more notes for supplies, but to send to him (A) for
them. Held, that these directions were "private instructions;" A was
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the other hand, the general agent may sell for cash although
limited to credit sales.145
Mlany other applications of the doctrine are to be found in
the books. 146 INo distinction is made between "limitations" and
liable. New York Telephone Go. v. Barnes, 85 N. Y. S. 327 (1903)
Compare, Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 5 So. 190, 2 L. R. A. 808
(1888). Here the 6purt charged the jury as follows: "If D employed
said T, and put him in charge of his retail store at W, to conduct
his mercantile business, and placed money to his credit in L. and in
N., and authorized him to use this money with cash receipts in re-
plenishing the stock, and told him not to purchase on credit, then
T was, as to innocent third parties, D's general agent in that business,
and had authority to do whatever was usual or customary in conduct-
ing ,the same, and D would therefore be liable for goods bought from
the plaintiff on credit, unless the plaintiff had notice that T's authority
was limited to purchases for cash." Held (for D reversed), that the
charge was erroneous, because the facts stated, without more, would
not justify the inference by the plaintiff that the agent had authority
to purchase goods on credit. T was a general agent with special
powers to purchase. The doctrine of "general agency" limited. Contra,
Parsons v. Armor, 3 Pet. 413, 7 L. Ed. 724 (1830). Query- Would the
Supreme Court follow this case today?
1'4 German American Building Association v. Droge, 14 Ind. App.
691, 41 N. E. 397 (1895) (in part).
111: Gibson v. Snow Hardware Co., 94 Ala. 346, 10 So. 304 (1891)
(one dealing with general agent is not bound to inquire as to the ex-
tent of his authority). Mongtomery v. Arkansas Cold Storage and Ice
Co., 93 Ark. 191, 124 S. W 768 (1910) (impliedly). Three States
Lumber Co. v. Moore, 132 Ark. 371, 201 S. W 508 (1918). An agent
to rent lands is a general agent, and, as such, may validly rent lands
for cash even though he was instructed to rent only for a share of
the crop. Pederal Surety Co. v. White, 88 Colo. 238, 295 Pac. 281
(1930). Interstate Savings and Trust Co. v. Hornsby, 146 S. W. 960
(1912) (Texas, not reported elsewhere). A was a Colorado corpora-
tion engaged in loaning money on real estate. B was its agent for the
state of Texas. C borrowed money from A through B at a usurious
rate. Held, (for C), that B was a general agent and his usurious agree-
ment bound the A company, despite some unlisclosed limitation on his
authority. Otherwise, "usurers who act through agents could easily
ply their vocation without fear og. detection." Associated Press v. In-
ternational News Service, 240 Fed. 983 (D. C. N. Y.) (1917), modified
by C. C. A., 245 Fed. 244 (1917), affirmed by' Supreme Court in 248 U.
S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68, 63 LI. Ed. 211, 2 A. L. R. 293. Aetna Indemnity
Co, v. Ladd, 135 Fed. 636 (C. C. A. Ore.) (1905). Lyons Milling Co. v.
Goffe and Carkner, Inc., 46 F (2d) 241, (C. C. A. Kan.) (1931). Empire
Rice Mill Co. v. Stone, 155 Ark. 623, 245 S. W 15 (1922). One Kunz was
authorized by plaintiff to purchase rice on its account in the- locality
where D was engaged in growing it. K bought 3 carloads of rice from
D and gave him a draft drawn directly3 on plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed
he never bought the rice because K's authority was limited to buying
rice to be shipped to its place of business in New Orleans, with draft
for purchase price attached to the bill of lading. Held (for D on its
counterclaim), that K was a general agent, hence persons dealing with
him were not bound by unknown limitations on his authority. Brown-
ing v. McNear, 145 Calif. 272, 78 Pac. 722 (1904), "in the determination
of the question as to what the agreement actually was, limitations as
to the general transaction privately placed by D upon the general
authority of the agent, and not communicated to P, cannot, under the
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circumstances of this case, play any part." Robtnson v. American Fish
and Oyster Co., 17 Calif. App. 212, 119 Pac. 388 (1911). Phoensx In-,
surance Co. v. Gray, 107 Ga. 110, 32 S. E. 948 (1899). The Home Life
Insurance Co. v. Pierce, 75 Ill. 426 (1874). Gray v. Merchants Ins. Co.,
113 Ill. App. 537 (1904) (a very queer case). Hodges v. The Bankers
Surety Co., 152 Ill. App. 372 (1909). Hickhorn, Mack and Co. v. Bradley,
117 Ia. 130, 90 N. W 592 (1902). Crescent City Bank v. Hernandez,
25 La. Ann. 43 (1873). (1) A, the defendant herein, was a stock,
money and exchange broker, B was his principal clerk. (2) By power
of attorney A authorized B to (a) transact all his affairs in the city,
(b) to handld all his correspondence, (c) "ta make checks and draw
money out of any bank or banks wherein the same may have been
deposited in the name or for account of said appearer." (3) B drew
an accommodation check in favor of C on a bank in which A then
had no funds. C transferred the check to the Crescent Bank, the plain-
tiff herein. (4) A claimed that B had no authority to draw accom-
modation checks on banks where A then had no funds, or to draw
checks for larger sums than the amount at that time on deposit. But,
held. (for the bank), that the defense was bad. Interstate Electric Co.
v. Frank Adam Electric Co., 173 La. 103, 136 So. 283 (1931), Allis v.
Votgt and Herpolshezmer, 90 Mich. 125, 51 N. W. 190 (1892), Baker v.
Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 91 Minn. 118, 97 N. W 650 (1903),
Sails v. Miller, 98 Mo. 478 (1889), Porter v. Woods, 138 Mo. 539, 39
S. W 794 (1897), Cross v. Atchison, Topeka and SantaFe Railroad
Go., 141 Mo. 132, 42 S. W. 675 (1897) (an unknown limitation on the
authority of a general counsel of a railroad, viz., that he should not
agree to pay annual salaries, held not binding on local lawyers whom
he employed), Higbee v. Billick, 244 Mo. 411, 148 S. W 879 (1912),
Mitchell v. Samford, 149 Mo. App. 72,130 S. W 99 (1910), Schwartz v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 82 N. H. 177, 131 Atl. 352 (1925), Michigan
Idaho Lumber Co. v. Northern Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 35 N. D.
244, 160 N. W 130. (1916). The A Insurance Co. insured a saw mill
property in Idaho through its general agents in Chiacgo. A fire
occurred and the Chicago agents adjusted the loss. A sent a draft for
the amount of the adjustment to the agents, but prior to its delivery
directed that delivery be held up pending investigation. The agents
went ahead and delivered it. Held, that the delivery of the draft was
good. Query- How can this be? The principal had absolutely pro-
hibited the agent from doing what he did. He disobeyed his positive
orders, and yet delivery was held good. Perhaps the answer is that
the case is just as if his authority had been revoked. Nevertheless he
could still bind his prmcpial to third parties who had no notice. West-
ern Homestead and Irrigation Co. v. First National Bank of Albuquerque,
9 N. M. 1, 47, Pac. 721 (1897) (by-laws of a corporation held not bind-
ing on a general manager). Munn v. Commission Co., 15 Johns. 44, '8
Am. Dec. 219 (1818). The Commission Company provided in its by-
laws for the appointment of an agent, his powers and duties being
defined therein. A committee of the directors also drew up regulations
governing the agent. The agent accepted a bill of exchange for rum
not yet deposited with the company. When sued on the draft the
company contended that the authority of the agent was limited to
acceptance on goods already deposited. But, held that the agent was a
general one and the limitation was not binding. Cohen v. Goldstein,
128 N. Y. S. 69 (1911). A authorized B to employ and discharge em-
ployees of A. Held that B was a general agent for hiring. A had per-
haps limited B's authority to hirings from week to week. Held that
evidence of a hiring of the plaintiff by B for A, for a year period,
should have been admitted. National Surety Co. v. Miozrancy, 53 Okla.
322, 156 Pac. 651 (1916). Here B was the general agent of the A
Surety Co. of New York with authority to execute judicial bonds. Mis-
understanding a telegram from the company which directed him not
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"secret" or "private" instructions. Both yield equally to the
application of the rule. 4 7
Occasionally, by a deviation from the norm, courts have
held that the doctrine of the non-binding quality of limitations
of authority applied to both classes of agents, special as well as
general 14s but subsequent decisions in such jurisdictions have
brought these juristic units back to the norm of judicial process
as exemplified in the numerous decisions cited in notes 137 to
146, supra. Now and then, a court will, hold that a general
agent's silence concerning limitations on his authority cannot
render such limitations ineffective, 149 but on the whole, the cases
show that there is very little peril in dealing with a general
agent.
The argument apparently has never been advanced that a
general agent might act and thereby bind his principal in spite
of known limitations on his authority Such a theory has no
support in the law, yet two mid-western decisions lend some
to execute a bond running to C, B did execute such a bond. Held (for
C), that the rule now under discussion applied. (This is correct. The
principal should be liable for his agent's mistakes. Southwestern
Surety Insurance Co. v. Marlow, 78 Okla. 313, 190 Pac. 672 (1920),
Daniel v. Pappas, 93 Okla. 165, 220 Pac. 355 (1923), Jackson v. Emmens,
119 Pa. 356, 13 Atl. 210 (1888), Williams v. Getty, 31 Pa. 461, 72 Am.
Dec. 757 (1858), Thompson, Executrix v. Barrow, 81 Pa. Super Ct. 216
(1923), Rice v. Jackson, 16 Pa. C. C. R. 15 (1894). Here the general
agent of a railway promotion syndicate was held to have authority to
employ an engineer even though the members of the syndicate had
previously agreed among themselves that the general agent should not
employ the engineer except on certain conditions which were never
fulfilled. A strik2ng sns faii' of a real limitation of authority being
held not binding on a third party dealing with a general agent.
"I' An examination of the cases cited, supra in the notes under this
heading will show at once that this is so.
"sBryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96 (1846), Mars v. Mars,
27 S. C. 132, 3 S. E. 60 (1887). "There are two classes of agents, gen-
eral and special, and their powers, when properly analyzed, are gov-
erned by the same general principle, to-wit: they can do anything
within the scope of their agency so as to 1ind the principal, notwith-
standing there may be some secret instructions lilniting the powers."
1,9 Mitrowsch v. Fresno Fruit, etc., 123 Calif. 379, 55 Pac. 1064 (1899).
The court instructed the jury that: "if you should find from the evi-
dence that Dunlap was employed by D and the partnership as an agent
to represent them in dealing with the plaintiff and that said Dunlap
did not disclose to the plaintiff any limitations on his authority to
contract with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not know that he was
not authorized to contract with reference to the purchase, of the figs,
and you should find from the evidence that said Dunlap did make
contract for the purchase of the figs on behalf of the partnership of
the defendant, then you should find for the plaintiff." Held, the above
instruction was clearly erroneous.
AGENCY, GENERAL AND SPECIAL
countenance to tins argument. 150 We may confidently assert
that such is not, and will not ever be, the law.151
We have hitherto seen that the rule of dealing at one's peril
applies with particular severity to special agents who act for
their own benefit or that of a tnrd party, rather than for the
benefit of their principal. Similarly, the rule of freedom from
limitations of authority can have no application to a general
agent who, to the knowledge of the other party, perpetrates a
fraud on ins principal, 1 52 or acts for his own benefit or that of a
tinrd party 1
5 3
It is sometimes argued that "the master at his peril, ought
to take care what servant he employs.'1
54
This argument assumes that the principal gives ins agent a
character when he sends him out into the world to deal with
tnrd parties, that he holds the agent out as worthy of credit, as
honorable, honest and competent. 155
mPalmer and Sons v. Cheney, 35 Ia. 281 (1872), 0. C. 0. and I.
Ry. Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 348, 9 L. R. A. 754, 22 Am. St. Rep. 593,
26 N. E. 159 (1890).
m5Hutson v, Prudential Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 847, 50 S. E. 1000
(1904), United States v. Williams, 1 Ware 173, Fed. Cas. No. 16724
(D. C. Maine) (1830).
5 The Town of Canaan v. De Rush, 47 N. H. 212 (1866). A civil
war bounty case. The Selectmen of the town (general agents presum-
ably) knowingly permitted an inhabitant to conceal, a hernia and
thereby to pass the medical examination and receive the bounty. A
few days later he was rejected. Held (for the Town), in an action to
recover the bounty, that the Selectmen had exceeded their authority.
They had really perpetrated a fraud' on their principal.
13 Wickham, Assignee v. Morehouse, 16 Fed. 324 (C. C. Pa.) (1883).
No agent, however general his powers, has implied authority to pledge
the credit of his principal for his own private debts. The law imposes
a duty,of inquiry on the third party. Analogously, Chrystie v. Foster,
61 Fed. 551 (C. C. A. N. Y.) (1894). "He who assumes to rely upon
the authority of an agent to bind his principal to the discharge of
the agent's own obligation must prove actual auth'ority if contest
arises." State National Bank of St. Joseph, Mo. v. Newton National
Bank, 66 Fed. 691 (C. C. A. Kansas) (1895), National Bank of Oshkosh
v. Munger, 95 Fed.. 87 (C. C. A. Wis.) (1899), Pacfic Lumber Co. v.
Moffat, 134 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. Colo.) (1904).
Thus argued the learned colonial barrister in 1 Virginia Colonial
Decisions R. 70 (1728-1741) (Barrett v. Gibson).
mKilborn v. Prudential Insurance Co., 99 Minn. 176, 108 N. W
861 (1906) (an erroneous decision on the facts). The Farmers' and
Mechantcs' Bank of Kent County, Maryland v. The Butchers' and
Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, 69 Am. Dec. 678 (1857). "The bank
selects its teller and places him. in a position of great responsibility.
The trust and confidence thus reposed in him by the bank leads others
to confide in his integrity. Persons having no voice in his selection
are obliged to deal with the bank through him. If, therefore, while
acting in the business of the bank, and within the scope of his em.
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In view of the relatively small number of decisions on the
point, it is somewhat hard to say whether this idea represents
general law. Perhaps such decisions are merely a line of last
resource for a court which desires to reach a particular result
in the interests of justice on a state of facts rendering such
result difficult of attainment.
(b) Apparent Authority as Related to General Agency.
Apparent authority, of course, may create a general
agency, 156 but this is a distinction as to the origin of the parti-
cular general agency under observation, not as to the legal effect
thereof. Apparent authority and general agency may also be
treated as synonomous by a court,15T and apparent authority
assumed to exist where there is really nothing more than gen-
ployment, so far as is known or can be seen by the party dealing with
him, he is guilty of misrepresentation, ought not the bank be held
responsible?" This case probably overrules the President, Directors
and Co. of the Mechanics Bank v. The New York and New Haven Rail-
road Co., 13 N. Y. 599 (1856), wherein the opposite view was expressed.
The Massachusetts Life Insurance Co. v. Eshelman, 30 Oh. St. 647
(1876). The soliciting agent of the A Insurance Company accepted
an application for insurance from C and then forwarded to the com-
pany a spurious, forged application, thereby concealing from his prin-
cipal the true state of the health of the assured. Unaware of the fraud
practiced upon it, the company issued a policy, based, of course, on
the forged application. But, held (for the deceased assured), that the
fraud of the solicitor must be borne by his principal. Note: A truly
astonishing decision. The fraud was not for the benefit of the assured,
it was hardly an act of the authorized class, it was malodorous with
evidbnce of collusion. It benefited only the third party This result
was reached by erroneously applying the doctrine now under discus-
sion. The court talks of notice to the company through the solicitor,
but clearly their interests were adverse. The solicitor was out to get
"his," no matter what happened to the insurance company. The Penn-
sylvania Company v. The Franklin Fire Insurance Company, of Phila-
delphia, 181 Pa. 40, 37 Atl. 191, 37 L. R. A. 780 (1897), The Bank of
Kentucky v. The Schuylkill Bank, 1 Pars.. Eq. Cas. 180 (1846).
Compare, Verdine v. Olney, 77 Mich. 310 (1889).
15'Keith v. Herschberg Optical Co., 48 Ark. 138 (1886), Grant v.
Burrows, 139 Ark. 16, 212 S. W 95 (1919), Oil City Iron Works V.
Bradley, 171 Ark. 45, 283 S. W. 362 (1926), Murray v. California Can-
serving Co., 30 Calif. App. 625, 193 Pac. 959 (1920). Compare, Dunlap
v. Dean, 292 Pac. 991, 109 Calif. App. 300 (1930), Hakes v. Myr2ck, 69
Ia. 189, 28 N. W. 575 (1886), Interstate Electric Co. v. Frank Adam
Electric Co., 17& La. 103, 136 So, 283 (1931), Gillis v. Duluth, North
Shore and ,Southwestern Railroad Co., 34 Minn. 301, 25 N. W. 603
(1885), Michigan, Idaho Lumber Co. v. Northern Fire and Marine In-
surance Co., 35 N. D. 244, 160 N. W. 130 (1916), Phoenz Furniture
Co. of Port Arthur v. Kay, 10 S. W (2d) 422 (Tex.) (1928) Great Amer-
ican Casualty Co. v. Eichelberger, 37 5. W. (2d) 1050, (Tex.) (1931).
Compare, Zummock v. Polasek, 199 Wis. 529, 227 N. W. 33 (1929).
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eral agency, and, lastly, apparent authority may be genuinely
super-added to a general agency 158
The number of decisions in which the courts have talked
about apparent authority, when there was really nothing more
than general agency, is astonishng.15 9
With some diffidence, in view of the great stress laid on
apparent authority by the courts and law schools, the suggestion
is made that the term is a much over-used and much over-
emphasized phrase. It is used with extreme frequency where
another equally good explanation ]s that of general agency It
is submitted that "general agency" is less vague and has a more
definite content than "apparent authority", which is likely to
become a "catch-all" like the phrases "res gestae", "estoppel",
"'as between two innocent parties", "caveat emptor", etc.
To be sure, general agency need not be known to the third
party,'00 whereas apparent authority must be,1 61 from which it
follows that there are some cases in which the two are not the
same and the term apparent authority serves a real purpose.10 2
(c) A General Agent May Become a Special Agent "Ad
Hoc."
It is easy to conceive the proposition that a special agent for
one purpose may become a special agent of the same principal
for a different purpose, without thereby changing the classifica-
tion of lus agency 103 This situation tends to become quite
complicated, however, when a general agent becomes also a
special agent of the same principal.
The trouble lies in the fact that it may amount to setting
a trap for the unwary third party who, confidently and properly
relying on the fact of general agency, assumes that the agent is
also a general one with respect to the deal in which he is now
representing his principal. This assumption is a perfectly
natural one, yet the cases show beyond doubt, that a general
u8Roehl v. Volckmann, 103 Wis. 484, 79 N. W. 755 (1899).
For examples of this type of loose talk see, Fishbaugl& y. Spun-
augle, 118 Ia. 337, 92 N. W 58 (1902), and Atlas Assurance Co.,. Ltd.
of London, England v. The, Rub, Inc., 109 Okla. 101, 235 Pac. 172 (1925).
'"Doan v. Duncan, 17 Il1. 272 (1855).
nRestatement, Section 10.
10 Compare, Doan v. Duncan, 17 Ill. 272 (1855).
IORussell and, Co. v. Cox, I& Ky. L. R. 1087, 38 S. W. 1087 (1897)
(solicitor for other machinery authorized to. sell ai. engine and boiler>.
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agent may become a special agent ad hoc, in which case the grant
of specific power ordinarily overrules the charter of general
authority 10 4
Of course one may be a special agent in one transaction,
even though ordinarily a general agent, where the °transaction
involved is entirely outside the scope of the general agency 165
(d) A General Agent is Restrcted to the Business of tha
Prsncspal.
There are certain well-recognized limitations on the author-
ity of a general agent. He is not an alter ego of his principal
114 McDermott v. Bancroft, 219 Ala. 205, 121 So. 735 (1929). Action
by stage carpenter against a theater for wages. Defense: payment to
business agent of stage employee's union. Reply (at trial) that the
business agent had authority to collect only one account. Held (for
plaintiff affirmed), that Pistole (Oh, Bard of Avon), the business
agent, was not the general agent of the individual members of the
union merely because of his position as local agent, thereof, as a mat-
ter of law, as contended for by defendant. Brutinel v. Nygren, 17 Ariz.
491, 154 Pac. 1042 (1916)..Here one Dunn was the general agent of
his mother-in-law (a French woman) to manage a drug store at Clif-
ton. Later he became her special agent to find a purchaser for the
business satisfactory to the lady-owner. (The Alabama case, supra, is
weakened by the fact that the union is a sort of legal entity so that
it could be said that there were two principals.) Ladd v. Town of
Franklin, 37 Conn. 53 (1870) (selectmen, who are ordinarily general
agents, became special agents under the particular facts of the case
which involved a civil war bounty). Hakes v. Myrick, 69 Ia. 189, 28
N. W 575 (1886) (general agent in charge of land given special au-
thority to collect a note). Vigers v. Kilshaiv, 13 La. 438 (1839) (agent
in entire charge of a trading business specifically directed to ship three
hundred hogsheads of tobacco to London under certain circumstances).
Collateral Loan Co. v. Sollinger, 195 Mass. 135, 80 N. E. 811 (1907)
(stated, supra note 108). Scott v. McGrath, 7 Barb. 53 (1849) (stated
supra note 37). Mesggs v. Mezggs, 15 Hun. 453 (1878). A residing in
Peru, had, as a business correspondent in New York, one B. A wrote
B two letters, the intent of which was that B should buy $100,000 in
bonds and deliver them to 0, the bonds to be held by C for A's chil-
dren, provided only that A encountered a threatened pecuniary dis-
aster, A intending otherwise to still retain a power over them. B
bought the bonds and delivered them to C, taking a receipt therefor,
in which it was stated that they were to be held in trust for'A's chil-
dren. Held, (for A, bonds returned to him), that B was a special agent
and had exceeded his authority. Even though B was a general agent,
he acted here under special authority and the defendants were donees.
If bona fide purchasers had been tnvolved, then a different result might
have been reached. Interstate Securities Co. v. Third National Bank,
231 Pa. 422, 80 Atl. 888 (1911) (chief bond officer of a securities com-
pany given specific authority to pledge certain bonds. It appears, how-
ever, that the third party knew of the special authorization granted to
the agent). Daniel v. Adams, Ambler, 495 (1764) (steward given special
authority to sell two old houses at auction).
1¢ Forman and Co., Proprietary, Ltd. v. The Ship Ltddesdale, A. C.
190 (1900) (Privy Council).
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and all general -grants of authority or holdings out must be
judged by the business with reference, to which they are given. 1 6
In other words, general agency is to be restricted and limited to
the business of the principal in which the agent is employed.
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Gu6ltick and Holmes v. Grover, 33 N. J. L. 463, 97 Am. Dec. 728
(1868), Park Hotel Co. v. Fourth National Bank of St. Louis, 86 Fed.
742 (C. C. A. Ark.) (1898).
I'l Gates Iron Works v. Denver Eng. Works Co., 17 Colo. App. 15,
67 Pac. 173 (1901). P sold mining machinery to the Gates Co. through
the latter's agent, Berkey. The Gates Co. was located in Chicago and
its business was the manufacturing of mining machinery. The Gates
Co. furnished Berkey with letterheads and cards stating their business
and the fact that B was their "manager," also giving B's Denver ad-
dress. The Gates Co. knew that B advertised himself as manager
of their Denver office. Held (for the Gates Co., reversed), that B was
the general agent of the Gates Co. at Denver, but his authority was
limited to selling. Such being the business of the Gates Co., even its
general agent could not buy the articles which it itself sold. Stowe v.
Wyse, 7 Conn. 214 (1828). The general agent of a manufacturing com-
pany is not authorized to transfer by deed the real estate of the com-
pany, without a special power; but this is explainable by another rule
of agency, that of "equal dignity." Thomas v. Harding, 8 Me. 417
(1832). In a partnership composed of A, B, C and D, 09 was assigned
the duty to "make sale of the paper and collect stock;" i. e., rags. C
gave the firm's promissory note (it owned a paper mill) for a bale of
factory cloth. Held (defendant not liable on the note, the others hav-
ing defaulted). The cloth was no more suitable for the business of the
firm than so much sugar, coffee, or tinware. Hence -the act of the
agent (partner), did not bind the firm. Davies v. Eastern Steamboat
Co., 94 Me. 379, 47 Atl. 896, 53 L. R. A. 239 (1900). Even though the
captain of a ship is a general agent, he cannot bind the owner by
accepting a telegram addressed to a passenger on board ship. It was
not part of the business on which he was employed. " A gen-
eral agent ts not an unlimited agent." Odiorne v. Maxey, 13 Mass. 178
(1816) (general agency held not to confer authority to bind principal
by an accommodation endorsement. "The authority of a general agent
is not unlimited"). Cowan v. Sargent Manufacturing Co., 141 Mich. 87,
104 N. W 377 (1905). Here the principal was a Michigan concern en-
gaged in the manufacture of reclining and folding chairs, revolving
bookcases, hospital supplies and invalid goods. The principal had a
branch store in New York City, of which store the agent was in charge
(general agency, place rule). The agent purchased bedroom and parlor
furniture of the plaintiff in the name of the principal (defendant
herein). Held (for the principal, affirmed), that the general agent
went outside of the business of his principal. The Planters' Bank v.
Cameron, 11 Miss. 609 (1844) (another case of an accommodation en-
dorsement). The Mechanics' Bank v. Schaumberg and Hills, 38 Mo.
228 (1866) (agent holding powers of attorney from two principals can-
not bind either of them by a joint act). Brosnahan v. Philip Best Brew-
ing Co., 26 Mo. App. 386 (1887). A owned a saloon and fixtures and
goods therein. Being called away by illness of his father, he left his
brother B in charge. B, being pressed by C, for a debt due him from
A, turned possession of the property over to C. A, returning, sues C
in trover. Held (for A affirmed), "that B had no authority to dispose
of A's business. It was not within the line of his agency." Brockway
v. Mullin, 46 N. J. L. 448, 50 Am. R. 442 (1884). A general agent to
manage a hotel cannot bind his principal by a contract for the sifeA
keeping of hired horses. It is not part of the business of a hotel, and
K. L.-5
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It is also limited to the direct interest of the property of the prin-
cipal.168
In an Iowa case,1 9 it was held erroneous to instruct a jury
"if a party hold out another as Ins general agent, he is bound
by the agreement of such agent in regards to the bustness of the
agency " The court thought that there was a great difference
between the scope of authority of a general agent and the busi-
ness of his agency This distinction would appear to be an arti-
ficial one.
Not only is general agency restricted to the business of the
principal, but the general agent is also limited to Ins own depart-
ment of the business, 170 provided his authority extends no
further.
would give a general agent unlimited authority. Cochran and Rath-
burn v. Newton, 5 Demo 482 (1848), Provdence Machine Co. v. Brown-
sng, 72 S. C. 424, 52 S. E. 117 (1905). An agent appointed to rent land
or manage it to suit himself has no authority to make his principal
a member of a partnership. Compare, Trammel v. Turner, 82 S. W
325 (1904) (Tex.-not reported elsewhere). Mauk v. Lee, 66 Wash. 184,
119 Pac. 185 (1911). A case wherein the language of the power of
attorney was held to convey power to the agent to act in matters other
than the business of the firm in which the principal was a member.
sPerry v. Jones, 18 Kan. 552 (1877). Compare, Blair v. National
Shirt and Overalls Co., 137 Ii. App. 413 (1907).
"*Richmond v. Greeley, 38 Ia. 666 (1874).
'"Pinkerton v. Gilbert, 22 Ill. App. 568 (1887). Here one Atkins was
superintendent of the mills of a cotten company, one of the defendants
herein. A had general oversight of the mills, hired and fired opera-
tives, and bought and sold goods for the company. He employed
Pinkerton, a detective agency, to institute and prosecute a replevin
suit in the course of which the plaintiff was arrested on body execu-
tion. Plaintiff now sues Pinkerton and the cotton company for false
arrest. Held (for the cotton company, against Pinkerton, affirmed),
that A's duties had nothing to do with the fiscal concerns of the cotton
company such as the receipt or payment of money, or collection or
enforcement of demands in favor of the company. Consequently, his
employment of Pinkerton did not bind the company and, respondeat
superior did not apply. C. C. C. and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. The Moline
Plow Co., 13 Ind. App. 225, 41 N. E. 480 (1895) (stated, supra note
120). Compare, Adriance v. Roome, 52 Barb. 399 (1868). The rule
applied here to the superintendent of the manufacturing company
whose actual authority was "to have charge of the manufacturing de-
partment of the work, audit bills, for materials, and to appoint and
discharge foremen and workmen." Held, that the superintendent had
no authority to sell iron belonging to the company, or to borrow money
on its account. Mundis v. Bmig, 171 Pa. 417, 32 Atl. 1135 (1895). A
general authority to procure contracts to dig artesian wells does not
imply any authority to do the work or to engage workmen for that
purpose. Such authority belongs to another department of the business.
Cable v. Paine and Co., 8 Fed. 788 (C. C. Ia.) (1881). A general travel-
ing agent for the sale of manufactured lumber has no authority to
enter into a contract on behalf of his principal for the sale of timber
in the rough.
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General agency may also be restricted by the settled custom
of the business. 171  It is axiomatic that custom may enlarge an
authority, but this point is outside the scope of this article. The
effect of custom as restricting an authority occurs rather infre-
quently
GENERAL AGENCY-RESTRICTED TO THE UsuAL-DOES NOT
INCLUDE THE UNUSUAL I
General agency seldom implies authority to perform an un-
usual or extraordinary act, not connected, in the ordinary course
of events, with the business on which the agent is employed. For
the most part it is limited to the usual and normal way of act-
Mg.17
2
'I 1U. S. Life Insurance Co. v. Advance Co., 80 Ill. 549 (1875). Here
one Green was general agent for the insurance company for the state
of Illinois and contracted a bill for advertising. It seems that there
was a general custom in the life insurance business not to allow their
general agents any discretion in incurring debts for advertising (i. e.,
they could not charge the credit of the principal, insurance company,
without its specific consent). Held (for the Insurance Company), that
this custom restricted the authority of the general agent.
17,1Shaw v. Stone, 1 Cush. 228 (1848). A cotton and woolen com-
pany appointed B and company "general agents in Boston for selling
and buying and also for taking a general supervision and control of the
affairs of the company." Held, that B and Company could not resort
to unusual and expensive means of raising money for its principal.
Query- Suppose there be a panic or a depression; is not the agent
supposed to do his ut)nost? Bohanan v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 70
N. H. 526, 49 At. 103 (1900). Here the claim agent of the railroad,
B, obtained a release from the plaintiff in consideration of $500 and
steady employment during good behaviour. Plaintiff sues for breach
of this agreement. Held (for the defendant railroad), that even if B
were a general agent of the defendant to settle claims, the plaintiff
was not justified in believing that he had authority to make extra-
ordinary and unusual contracts, such as an agreement to employ for
life. Query- It seems that the claim agent could agree to give em-
ployment for a limited time with no specific limit being set. Where,
then, is the dividing line? Is "for life" the only limit, and anything up
to that all right? Kipp v. East River Electric Light Co., 46 N. Y. St.
Rep. 397, 19 N. Y..S. 387 (1892). The superintendent (general) of an
electric light and power company has no implied authority, to employ
an undertaker to bury an employee of the company, where it does not
appear that the death occurred in the service of the company or on its
premises. Thiel Detective Service Co. v. McClure (C. C. A. Ky.), 142
Fed. 952, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843 (1906). Construction of a power of
attorney giving general authority. Held, not to confer authority to
employ a detective agency to investigate the management of a cor-
poration in which the principal was a stockholder. Compare, Dun-
woody v. Saunders, 50 Fla. 202 39 So. 965 (1905). A hired a barge or
lighter of B, which was subsequently lost, hence this suit. The hiring
was done by A's general agent, C, who had charge of A's barge and
tug-boat business. The question was whether A's agent, C, had author-
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CONCLUSION
I began by pointing out a seeming discrepancy between
recent writers on Agency and the professional teachers of the
subject, on the one hand, and our brothers practicing at the bar,
on the other, with respect to the existence, usefulness and desir-
ability of a distinction between general agents and special agents.
After reading most, perhaps nearly all, of the cases m point,
with some diffidence I challenged the position of the teachers.
I have attempted to show that special agency may, it is true, be
created by an appointment to perform a single act or trans-
action, but that this is not the only way in which special agency
may be created. I have shown that a limitation of authority
may create a special agency and that this is especially the case
with respect to numerical limitations and that class of agents
known as solicitors. We have seen that general agency may
also be created in various ways, notably as an inference from a
multitude of instances, or from the fact that the agent is the sole
representative of his principal in a given territory, or from
authority to handle all negotiations of a particular type, or to
make many contracts under the one authorization, or by the
invoking of a rule of evidence that known agents may ordinarily
be presumed to be general ones.
We have examined not only the methods in which general
and special agencies may be created, but also the legal conse-
quences that flow from each class of agents. We discovered
that third parties dealt at their peril with special agents, that
the latter must strictly pursue their authority, and that third
parties dealing with them were bound by limitations of author-
ity imposed upon them, even though such limitations had not
been disclosed. When we looked into general agency from this
standpoint, however, we discovered that the legal consequences
flowing therefrom were practically the antithesis of those flowing
from special agency The great principle of general agency, we
soon found, was that third parties are not bound by undisclosed
limitations placed by the employer upon his general agent. The
limit of the general agent's authority, we saw, was usually the
ity to agree that A should become an insurer during the voyage rather
than an ordinary bailee. Held (for 3, reversed), that C had authority
to bind his principal as an insurer. Dictum: that he could have bought
the barge outright.
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business of the principal. Our study did not embrace cases of
apparent authority, as such, but, in so far as they came up inci-
dentally, in our study of cases decided on general or special
agency, we concluded that apparent authority plays a very
negligible part in special agency, and that "general agency"
will explain many, if not most, cases covered by the loose term
"apparent authority", the use of which is likely to lead us into
a "jurisprudence of conceptions"
And so I have endeavored to portray a picture of the perti-
xient facts of the legal order, as expressed in the precedent ele-
ment of law, faithfully and accurately If my conception of the
facts in the problem is correct, and should be substantiated by
other investigators, then let us sincerely hope that this view will
prevail, and that the "unhappy gulf" between the jurists and
the judges will exist no more.
(To be concluded in November, 1933, issue of Kentucky Law Journal.)
